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STRUCTURAL CRISIS, DEPENDENT CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 
AND REGIONAL INEQUALITY IN GHANA 
Jacob Songs ore 
The Ghanaian political economy is in the throes of a deep 
and multi-faceted crisis symptomatic of institutional and 
economic breakdowns. Evidence of political instability is 
the fluidity of change of both civilian and military regimes. 
As a social crisis it is characterized by a profound aware-
ness (at least by the new left iritellectuals) of the neces-
sity for radical structural reforms. 
The growth of the economy in relation to population has 
been unimpressive and indeed is best described as a stag-
nation crisis. There is evidence of the inevitable long-run 
decline in cocoa output - the chief foreign exchange earner. 
The output of local foodstuffs has refused to grow and this 
accounts for a large proportion of inflation in the domestic 
economy. The industrial establishments, or rather 'assembly 
plants', have run dry of imported raw materials which account 
for a large proportion of their needs. Consequently, they 
are operating grossly under capacity. 
The economy is also faced with a huge external debt 
burden and last though not least there are marked and in-
creasing social inequalities at the interregional levels. 
Those most evident have not been made better by the increas-
ing social s.tratification and the polarization of wealth even 
at the level of regional society. 
Careful examination of the nature and origins of the 
contemporary patterns of spatial and social inequalities to-
gether with the current stagnation crisis reveals that they 
are directly and indirectly linked to the dependent capital-
ist nature of the historical process of development. In this 
regard, a major proposition being advanced is that there is 
a direct connexion between regional imbalances and this pat-
tern of development and that the former tends to increase as 
the latter becomes more deep-rooted.1 It is equally arguable 
that the frustrated nature of development planning signals 
a crisis in the overall structure of domination and dependence 
at the international and interregional levels. The basically 
undemocratic nature of the state apparatus deprives it of 
political legitimacy and support necessary to solicit from 
the population the sacrifices needed to initiate radical re-
forms. Nor could such reforms ever be initiated under con-
ditions of peripheral capitalism given the interests and con-
straints imposed on the nation at the national and internation-
al levels. 
The phase of colonial satellization of the national econ-
omy· is considered as having played a major role in the emer-
gence of the neo-c~lonial structures of dependence and the 
current patterns of regio'nal inequality. We shall thus have 
to study the organi_2:~Jj:on of __ th~_ c'lj,-':l_l_ec_~:Lc _ ]:)~j:.Yl~~n. colonial 
and neocolonial policies, and the structures inherited from 
previous periods. For purposes of analysis three historical 
'phases are identifiable: pre-colonial, colonial, and neo-
colonial. 
PRE~COLONIAL PHASE 
Perhaps one of the most important themes in the historical 
geography and economic history of West Africa as a whole has 
been the change in relative importance of the Sudan belt 
on the one hand and the forest- and coastal areas on ,the 
other. Between the 8th and 1Sth centuries A.D. especially, 
the grasslands of Western Sudan became the scene of an ex-
tensive interregional and international commerce and wit-
nessed the emergence of various kingdoms and empires pro-
viding the peace and stability which was necessary for carry-
ing on this commerce. The most significant of these empires 
were Ancient Ghana from which present-day Ghana derives its 
name, Mali and Songhai. This period extended from A.D. 800, 
with the emergence of ancient Ghana, to the. 16th century 
with the collapse of Songhai empire, which was the·most 
centralized and last of the three major empires. 2 During 
this period autonomous societies of feudal Europe and part-
icularly the states of the Sudan~Sahel region immediately 
south. of the Sahara developed along parallel lines precisely 
because of the long-distance trade which linked. them all. 3 
The trans-Saharan trade was largely instrumental in forging 
this link. The interaction was on the basis of equal part-
ners. 
This extensive international trade across the desert 
to North Africa, as well as the complementary interregional 
trade within the Sudan and between it and the forest areas 
to the south encouraged the rise of numerous cities. 4 Pre-
sent~day Ghana was .drawn into this network of interregional 
trade with Western Sudan through the activities of Mande and 
later Hausa middlemen. It is important to note that a signi-
ficant proportion of the commodities to be found in this 
trade, consisted of forest products of which present-day Ghana 
was an important producer. Whatever coherence Ghana possessed 
at the time, it owed not to uniform political control but 
to the network of trade routes along which traders moved and 
trade goods flowed. Trade not only brought different parts 
of the country together, it also drew Ghana closer than be-
fore to far-off places from which it obtained exotic pro-
ducts. S 
The centre of political and economic power, therefore, 
lay with the ~mpires of Western Sudan and the network of 
trade routes, together with the trade that passed throughout 
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the country, was oriented towards this centre of power. 
The general orientation of present-day Ghana was there-
fore towards Western Sudan. 
A process of state formation was induced by this trade. 
It would appear from the available evidence that it was in 
Northern Ghana that the first group of large and centralized 
states emerged, i.e. Mamprusi, Dagomba and Nanumba. This 
occurred in the zone between the forest to the south and 
the trading centres of the Niger bend and Hausaland to the 
north. These states functioned as middlemen in the trade 
between the two regions, and it would have been the need to 
control and ensure the security of trade routes whi.ch in-
cited either some of the incoming groups or previously 
settled rich families to use their cavalry to establish 6 
political domination over the existing groups of people. 
This occurred after the late 15th century and they founded 
or adopted existing settlements from which they ruled their 
states. These settlements became primordial towns. 7 Other 
states established later in the 17th century were Gonja, 
Wala, and Imola around Kaleo. 
South of the Volta, the process of state formation was 
also developing. According to tradition the Akan states of 
Bono-Manso to the north-west and Adansi to the south were 
the first to emerge and did so probably about the same time 
as the states of Mamprusi and Dagomba, that is during the 
first half of the 15th century. Bono-Manso arose at the 
meeting point of the savanna and the forest zones and near 
the important Dyula or Mande trading centre of Begho while 
Adansi arose in the gold-producing region. Both of them 
must have been the £irst to derive .the greatest wealth from 
north-south trade, the former as the main intermediary bet-
ween southern and northern traders, and the latter as the 
chief producer of the principal item of trade, namely, 
gold. 8 The emergence of some of the most illustrious king-
doms in the forest areas was to await the period of Afro-
European confrontation. According to Daaku, until the Euro-
pean era the Akan in the forest lived in a group of small 
chiefdoms or city-states which were organized on kinship 
·lines. 9 Similar observations apply to the Ewe groups and 
the coastal Ga. 10 
The change in fortunes between the Sudan belt on the 
one hand and the forest and coastal areas began to occur in 
the 15th century with the appearance for the first time of 
Europeans on the coast. With their search for trade goods, 
notably gold, and the disintegration of the Western Sudanic 
Empires in the 16th century, Ghana and West Africa as a 
whole did a round-about turn. 'The Atlantic Ocean, which had 
always been a barrier, now became a starting place, a begin-
ning: new foci of economic and political change emerged in 
the coast lands and forest regions. '11 With a new centre 
crystallizing on the coast associated with European activities 
there was a restructuring of the space-economy to fit the 
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new order in which the coast and the forest areas emerged 
as the most successful in the adjustment process. But the 
new trade between Europe and West Africa was not to play 
the same role as that of the preceding period since hence-', 
forth it was to take piace under mercantile capitalism. 
During this phase, the trade, initially in gold and 
ivory was quickly converted into trade in slaves as a new 
demand for cheap manpower developed in the West Indies. 
'The American periphery of the We~tern European mercantile 
centre played a decisive role in the' accumulation of money' 
wealth by the Western European' bourgeoisie. Black Africa 
played a no less important role: periphery of the 'periphery. 
Reduced to the role of supplier of slave labour for the 
plantations of America, ,Africa lost its autonomy. It began 
to be shaped according to foreign requirements, those of 
mercan,tilism •• 12 The ,effects of slave raiding and wars that 
produced the slaves were far-reaching, and caused a great " 
deal of destruction and devastation. Whole towns and vill-
ages were burnt doWiland farms destroyed 1 trade routes were 
disrupted, andi't also 'led' to the migration of people .13 
Certainly, many rulers,especially the Asante, acquiesced 
in the European slave trade for what they considered to be 
reasons of self-interest, but on no scale of rationality 
could the outflow of population be measured as anything but 
disastrous :to the societies of concern. Gonja and Sefwi areas 
bore the brUnt. ,Economic act,ivity was affected directly and 
indirectly by population loss. For instance, when the in-
habitants of a given area were reduced below a cert'ain number 
in an environment where tset~e fly was present, the remainder 
had to abandon the area. It was the first retrograde step 
in the underdevelopment of the, black race .It was a't this 
mercantilist phase that incipient dominance dependency struc-
tures were, ,laid between Europe and Africa respectively. 
One significant,'feature ,of the rise, expansion, and 
collapse of theAkan states at this -time has been the close 
relati'onship of the socio~political pattern with the opening 
of new trade routes between the hinterland and the markets 
of th,e coastal areas~ In fact the interaction between politics 
and economics is so close that they are both cause and effect 
of each other., It is no accident that the Akwamu, Denkyira, 
Ashanti, and even the Agona states all arose in the wake of 
Portuguese and other European trade and commerce in the 16th, 
17th and 18th centuries. The major ingredient in state for-
m~tion was therefore trade and commerce and the interest in 
its organization and control. Centralization of political power 
was in part necessitated by the desire of indigenous rulers 
to forge a more effective means of monopolizing control and 
access to the flourishing trade in men and merchandise on the 
coast. The socio-political continuity seems to have been based 
primarily on socio~economic continuity. The state system 
under kings or powerful chiefs made it possible, at any rate 
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before effective European colonization to secure and or-
ganize servile labopr and in largely pre-cash economy, to 
exploit the tribute system, with a correspondingly greater 
economic surplus for the kings who might even at this early 
stage be described as political entrepreneurs. 14 . 
The basis of power seems to have rested on the military 
strength of the various secular states. During this era, 
Northern Ghana was in the eclipse with the decline in the 
middleman function between the Western Sudan and the forest 
and as a result of the ravages of slave raiding on Gonja 
and to a lesser extent on other states. Nor was the area 
well-located for the new trade on the coast. Although the 
rise and fall of empires in the forest areas of Ghana fol-
lowed one another in succession, it was Ashanti which 
functioned as the major state combining middleman functions 
between the coast and northern Ghana with the direct pro-
duction of gold and kola nuts which attained the greatest 
development. Those coastal states more directly connected 
with European trade activities also attained some measure of 
development. At the peak of its power, no state in Ghana 
could rival Ashanti in terms of wealth in the precolonial 
era. 
The wealth that was generated was highly concentrated. 
Among the principal beneficiaries were the feudal aristo-
crats of the various states, the most notable being Ashanti. 
A number of merchants who were involved in the trade between 
the interior states and coastal forts also accumulated wealth. 
These included men with permanent employment in European 
companies. IS By contrast, the broad mass of the population, 
then engaged in primary activities, were poorly integrated 
into the exchange economy. The countryside of especially weak 
states was often impoverished by slave raids and many people 
lay outside. the mainstream of activities. This period of 
European mercantile penetration was to mark the first phase 
in the dependent integration of the economy into the inter-
national capitalist system. 
An urban system emerged within the spatial system from 
this pattern of activities. Along the coast were the towns 
associated with European forts, the most important being 
Elmina, Cape Coast and Accra. From these, a set of penetra-
tion lines extended to a system of middleman ·towns which 
served as collecting centres or intermediate nodes for col-
lection and transport to the ports or interior. FOSUi Akim 
Manso, Nyanao, Twifo and Herman were significant centres. 
The termini or source areas also had a set of towns. One of 
the most significant was the Asante capital, Kumasi. Kumasi 
in turn was the terminal point of the northern trade with 
another system of middleman centres existing in the interior, 
e.g. Begho, Kete Krachi, Wenchi, Salaga' and Atebubu. 
Further north, other centres developed along the east, and 
west trade routes. They include Walewale, Savelugu, Lawra, 
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and Larabanga. Besides these, the state capitals like Wa 
were also important trade centres. All these nodes were 
interconnected with a network of footpaths. 16 
The mercantilist phase was superseded by the period 
of direct colonial intervention. The general scramble for 
colonial dependencies in Africa was due to attempts by 
specific European powers to reduce the cut-throat competi-
tion in international trade by monopolizing foreign markets 
for their surplus manufactured products, and for the devel-
opment of tropical agricultural and mineral products then 
vital to industrial expansion in Western Europe. 17 Trade. 
might precede the flag but railways could only follow it. 18 
This marked the end of free competition under capitalism 
and a transition to the stage of monopoly capitalism or 
finance capital. 19 An immediate cause was the persistent 
threat by the As~nte to British interests on the coast. 
THE PHASE OF COLONIAL DOMINATION 
At a simple spatial level, a metropolis-satellite decision-
making structure emerged. It was at the centre nation, 
Britai~, that strategic high-level decisions were taken as 
to the broad guidelines of development policy for Ghana, 
the periphery or satellite nation, As early as 1875, Joseph 
Chamberlain saw the colonies as vast underdeveloped estates 
and Sir Charles Bruce emphasized that British colonies 
should be developed both to supply the United Kingdom with 
food and raw materials and to consume British manufactured 
goods. 20 'From the beginning, Europe assumed the power to 
make decisions within the international trading system. A-
bove all, European decision-making power was exercized in 
selecting what Africa should export - in accordance with 
European needs. '21 
What this implies is that in the then Gold Coast (Ghana), 
traditional chiefs, business interests of local origin to-
gether with the numerous small African producers, had to 
operate within the constraints imposed by the highly vertical 
interaction relations within a feudal structure imposed by 
colonial domination. The basic profile of what was to be 
termed the colonial development model can be seen as a 
function of policy transmitted down the hierarchy of decision-
making and the local response to policy in terms of reaction 
of entrepre·neurs to their opportunity field. . 
The colonial economy came to be characterized by the 
following features: 
(1) export production was limited to a few raw materials -
cocoa, gold, diamonds and timber in exchange for a 
variety of manufactured, chiefly consumer goods; 
(2) British and other expa.triate interests dominated the 
mining industry and the overseas trade resulting from (1); 
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(3) the metropolitan power, Britain, not only exerted 
considerable influence on economic policy but 
virtually controlled it. The chief aim of expatriate 
policy was to assist the flow of primary products, and 
to keep the door open for the sale of manufactured 
goods. The only limits to imports were those set by 
the purchasing power of ~ocal consumers; 
(4) the metropolitan power aimed at minimizing its fiscal 
obligations, and the colony was expected to balance 
its budget without external assistance; 
(5) through the West African.Currency Board, the monetary 
system of the colony became an appendage of that of 
Britain, while banking arrangements were concerned 
mainly with financing activities of expatriate firms 
notably UAC, and to a lesser extent UTC, SCOA, Cadbury, 
etc. Hence the long-term rates of growth of this type 
of economy depended on the size of export proceeds. 22 
Thus, an international division of labour and commodity 
production emerged which has been characterized by 
a process of uneven development both at the national 
and international levels. There is, therefore, the 
ne.ed to turn to the pattern of resource development 
that was to result from the above policies. 
Whereas British trade interests provided the stimu-
lus for the development of export activities and British 
administration created the necessary conditions, the re-
action of the Africans to their new economic opportunities 
was swift and efficient. Except in mining and timber sec-
tors, where external capital and technology was now being 
used, actual production for export was directed almost en-
tirely by Africans. 23 The development of the vital cocoa 
sector was an entirely African initiative. By 1910, Ghana 
was the world's second largest exporter of cocoa and the 
crop was the most valuable export from Ghana as its value 
exceeded that of gold; in 1911, Ghana had become the world's 
largest exporter of cocoa. 24 These were activities of great 
interest in the metropolitan economy and were supported 
through policy • 
One cannot, however, fully understand the dynamics of 
the cocoa-mineral economy except with reference to the in-
frastructural support provided by the colonial administration 
and the cheap. labour supply which together ensured its success. 
For example, it was not long before the colonial government 
began to realize the need for an effective road and rail 
transport policy to link the coastal ports and capital town 
with the area of mineral production. In a sense, government 
expenditures in infrastructure provided the 'big push' for 
private capital to invest profitably in the development of 
the export economy. The growth of trade experienced by the 
economy would hardly have been possible without expenditures. 
on harbours, wharves, culverts, road systems, railroads and 
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other public works as well as investments in administrative 
infrastructure, in health facilities, in the establishment 
of order through an organized police and army, and in support 
services . for directly productive activities such "as'cocoa' 
research and communication facilities. 25 All these factors 
helped to create the price conditions permitting the exten-
sion of the industry. 
There was no attempt to build such long railways in' 
the colonial state and the Northern Territories were left 
without railways. The railways were begun essentially to make 
extensive gold mining operations possible. Thus the first 
line begun at Sekondi in 1898 ran through the gold-min-
ing districts of Tarkwa and Obuasi up to Kumasi, which it 
reaChed,in 1903. The rapid growth of the cocoa industry 
created demands for a line further east, and in 1923 a 
line from Accra to Kumasi was completed. The two north-south 
lines were then linked by the Huni Valley line finished' in 
1924. 26 The major frontal attack on the transport problem 
was initiated in the much celebrated Guggisberg's ten-year 
development plan for the colony covering the period 1919-28 
and involving the expenditure of about £25 million mainly 
on improving the transport system. All the schemes were de-
signed to complete the structure of an outward-directed 
satellite economy. 
Activities aimed at the exploitation of the resources 
of Southern Ghana soon generated such a demand for labour 
that a deliberate strategy of labour displacement to the 
export sector from Northern Ghana had to be formulated. 
Consequently, .the administrative officers in the peripheral 
North·were to implement policies of labour recruitment, thus 
integrating peripheral regions into the national space econ-
omy through labour flows to the growth region. The then 
Northern.Territories were subjected to political violence 
with the adoption of forced ,labour policies and the desig-
nation of the area as a 'labour reserve'. 2 7 
Soon after" the British occupied NorthernGhana, the area 
was designated by the colonial administration as the source· 
of almost all the available unskilled labour supply, especial-
ly for the mines, army, police, and cocoa farms, and the 
region was vital for the continued development of the more 
favourably endowed southern areas of Ghana. So important 
was this source of labour supply that certain officers ad-
ministering the region did not favour its economic develop-
ment as it would halt the migration of labour to the South. 28 
Hence the region was also deliberately starved of develop-, 
ment funds. The policy of labour recruitment was started 
around 1900. Areas of the Volta Region whose ecological con-
ditions were not suitable for cocoa production soon develop-
ed as zones of labour out-migration. 
Although spatial and social inequalities in development 
were noticeable even in' pre-colonial days, it was largely in 
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the colonial phase that the generalized pattern of spatial 
inequalities emerged which continue to reflect strongly 
on current patterns. This pattern emerged largely as 'a 
function of colonial policy pursued during the period. 
The pattern of regional inequality that emerged was at-
tributed to the differential resource endowment of regions 
as perceived within the colonial development paradigm. 
A simple centre-periphery structure emerged over the 
space-economy (Fig. 1). In a generalized sense the centre 
consisted of the forest belt of central Ashanti, Eastern 
and Central Regions. The areas with the potential for 
cocoa, timber and minerals which were yet undeveloped were 
the resource frontiers which then consisted o,f much of 
north-west Brong Ahafo and the western Region. Another 
type of growth region consisted of the coastal port towns 
which played a crucial role for import-export activities. 
Sekondi-Takoradi and Accra were emerging as the most import-
ant centres of activity. Takoradi's importance was due to 
its role as a modern port-town and Accra was the adminis-
trative and commercial headquarters of the country. These 
towns monopolized much of the modern social infrastructure 
of the country and were engaged in a kind of hinterland 
piracy which led to the decline of most of the other 
coastal towns. Accra had a concentration of the highest 
level of decision-makers in the national setting and hence, 
could be described as the centre. The articulation of the 
spatial structure is shown in Fig. 2.29 ' 
The generalized periphery consisted of areas outside 
the .forest belt and coastal port towns with neither the 
relevant potentials for cocoa, timber and mineral produc-
tion nor the ability of functioning as centres for the articu-
lation of the outward-directed national economy as port 
towns. This consisted of the large land area of Northern 
Ghana which was not viewed in terms of its agricultural 
potential but rather as a labour reserve for the growth areas. 
This emerged as a depressed region and so were the northern-
most and south-eastern parts of the Volta Region (British 
Togoland) where cocoa culture was also not possible. This 
excludes the small cocoa_growing area around Jasikan. One 
residual impact of precolonial activity patterns on the 
fortunes of Northern Ghana like Sefwi was the depopulation 
of the central parts of the region as a result of slave, 
raids. This led to advancement of arguments against a rail-
way line to the North for want of adequate freight and yet 
in some cases as in Northern Nigeria and Uganda, commercial 
agriculture was generated due to the development of rail 
routes in advance of freight availability.3D 
Thus at the regional level, the colonial trade 
necessarily gave rise to a polarization of depen-
dent peripheral development. The necessary corol-
lary of the 'wealth' of the coast was the impover-
ishment of the hinterland. The exclusive allocation 
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of resources to the former zone, a planned policy 
of colonial trade, accentuated the regional 'im-
balance. The mass emigration from the hinterland 
to the coast formed part of the logic of the system: 
it made .. [cheap] labour available to capitalwhere" 
capital required it, and it is only 'the ideology of 
universal harmony' which sees in these migrations 
anything other than migrations which impoverish the 
departure zones. The culmination of the colonial 
trade was balkanization, in which the 'recipient' 
micro-regions had no 'interest' in 'sharing' the 
crumbs of the colonial cake with their· labour re-
serves. 31 
The north-south pattern of trade alignment associated 
with precolonial trade was consolidated by the construction 
of more permanent routes to replace the bush tracks and 
the dominance of Kumasi on the inland transport system. 
The skeletal structure of the spatial system which 
consisted of a north-south dendritic transport system 
and the dominance of Kumasi, Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi 
were to provide the framework for the systematic process of 
surplus extraction out of the Ghanaian space economy due to 
the imposition of unequal exchange and the penetration of 
foreign capital. 
THE POST-INDEPENDENCE NEOCOLONIAL DEPENDENCE 
Between 1945 and 1957, before formal independence was granted 
to the colony, the open colonial economy underwent substantial 
modifications, the chief of which centred on the expansion 
of the public sector and the gradual transfer of political 
if not economic power to Africans and the beginnings of 
modern indus.try. 32 
As Nkrumah so aptly puts it: 
In the face of growing militancy in the colonial 
dependency, imperialism has been simpiy shifting 
tactics. Without a qualm it dispenses with its 
flags, and even with certain of its more hated 
eXpatriate officials. This means, so it claims, 
that it is 'giving' independence to its former 
subjects to be followed by 'aid' for their 
development. Under cover of such phrases, how-
ever, it devises innumerable ways to accomplish 
objectives formerly achieved by naked colonial-
ism. 33 
The implication of the above observation is that whilst, 
nominally, political decision-making power was vested in the 
Ghanaian nationalist government in 1957, the basic organiz-
ational and spatial structures that formed the basis of the 
colonial economic structure remained intact. They were in 
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fact strengthened by policies pursued by the government 
itself. In all spheres of social and economic life the 
goal of the new elite was to emulate standards of the 
centre nation. 34 Consequently, nationalist economic 
policy was not directed at de-coupling the economy of the 
new nation from its vertical subordinate relations with 
Britain. They therefore failed to undertake the, adjustments 
necessary for achieving an internally integrated as op-
posed to art atrophied ,outward-directed development. It is 
significant to note that the fight against colonialism it-
self was more a function of the terms in which the elite 
were made to participate in it and not one of a fundamental 
dislike of the system of dependence as a whole. 
Thus under the 'strains and stresses of accelerated 
'modernization', ,the main thrust of government policy was' 
import-substitution industrialization. This created,the 
basis for the expansion of expatriate business interests 
from import-export trade, banking and mining into ,the in-
dustrial sector. This kind of policy also resulted in in-
creasing dependence on outside sources of credit to help 
finance investments. The result was that there was increas~ 
ing pressure from external financial oligarchies and donor 
countries on the government as they staked their right to 
participate in the strategic decision-making process at the 
national level as regards economic policy. 
The initial advantage of an early successful response 
within the cocoa-growing area to external demand was to 
create forces leading to the further concentration of growth 
within that region. The infrastructure was already avail-
able in the large towns of Accra, Sekondi-Takoradi and 
Kumasi within this region capable of supporting modern 
industry and the markets were similarly concentrated in 
the cash crop area. It is, therefore, 'no surprise that the 
basic development process after independence led to further 
spatial concentration of activity within these main urban 
areas which themselves had their raison d'etre in the role 
they played in the functional organization of the colonial 
economy. The primary export sector was to exist and expand 
alongsi,de the development of manufacturing industry. 
Long after independence, the cocoa industry, timber, 
gold, diamond and manganese export activities maintained 
their dominant role as key exports and they were to provide 
the necessary foreign exchange for the capital and raw 
material imports which supported the import-substitution 
industrialization strategy. The expansion of the cocoa in-
dustry which was organized by small-scale African entre-
preneurs was fast, especially with the rapid progress in 
road development during the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Consequently, its regional distribution within the forest 
area was enlarged to include the former resource frontier 
regions. 35, " , 
But perhaps the main thrust of government policy after 
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independence was in the area of industrial development -
a much n.eglected area .during the colonial period. This 
was to lead to further concentration of activity in 
very limited enclaves within the generalized gl:o'il.th_ar.eCi~ 
The structural changes which were bo occur in the 
Ghanaian economy through import substitution industrial-
. ization had their origins in colonial policy. Export 
expansion after 1945 had enabled the domestic market to 
expand to a certain minimum threshold level as to make it 
possible for the economy to support modern manufacturing 
industry. Besides, the colonial system had created an 
alienated westernized urban middle class (also the policy 
makers) who were accustomed to obtaining manufactured goods 
virtually identical with those available in the centre 
nation. These tastes, which seemed resistant to change, 
ruled out any question of adaptation of technique to tr~­
ditional industries as this would have meant a considerable 
adjustment in tastes. 36 This has been reinforced by the for-
ces which work to foster fragmentation of the initial 
-markets. The 'demonstration effect' of the top level British 
and Ghanaian administrative and business staff together 
with modern advertising created further pressures for 
higher absolute levels of living. Hence demand becomes 
further diversified even without a rise in income. 
The diversification of demand ha~ a two-fold conse-
quence •. First, it specifies the types of industries that 
can be set up, and sets the limits' to the choice of products 
that is a9ceptable within the given structure of domestic 
demands. 3 This was particularly obvious in Ghana's import 
substitution industrialization, where the structure of de-
mand had been established by previous imports. 38 
The cumulative process of growth which was initiated 
within the forest ecosystem by its incorporation into the 
international exchange economy together with added indus-
trialization, resulted in an intensified process of labour 
out-migration from the depressed regions into the more 
favoured regions. Unlike the colonial. era when labour mi-
gration was induced initially through coercion, the inter-
regional labour flows could now be explained in terms of 
largely economic factors - the strong desire for cash and 
material well-being. Additional factors are the demonstra-
tion effect of return migrants to home areas together with 
the extended family networks, especially in urban areas 
which guarantees unemployed migrants security and subsis-
tence until a job is available. 39 
As a result, the spatial system is marked by the con-
tinued functioning of a colonial spatial and organizational 
structure in the neo-colonial state. The spatial system is 
characterized by a north-south dendritic transport system 
and the primacy of Accra-Tema with its coastal location 
which is an epitome of the outward-directed integration of 
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the national space-economy. At the interregional level 
this spatial system is also characterized by increasing 
spatial inequality in levels of development. The simple 
north-south centre~periphery spatial model is now an 
over-simpli,fication because of the increasing dominance 
of the urban~industrial core and the creation of its new 
periphery - the export 'cash crop, timber"and mineral 'sector 
which nevertheless' still' 'superordi:nates 'the old periphery, 
;i.e. the non-export ".cash crop, areas, (Fig. 3.). 
. The location pattern of the industries is character-
ized by their high concentration in Accra-Tema, Sekondi-
Takoradi and Kumasi (Fig. 4). Accra-Temaalone accounted 
for 49% and 50% of the total number of people employed 
and 'the ~alue added respectively in the manufacturing 
sector. 4 According to the 1969 directory of industrial 
enterprises, Accra-Tema alone accounted for 59.5% of all 
industrial establishments. Kumasi has 16.5% and Sekondi-
Takoradi iO.2%. These towns together account for over 86% 
of all registered industrial enterprises in the country.41 
Together they constitute the centre in the old generalized 
growth area of the colonial era. 
A number of related locational advantages account for 
this pattern. First, colonial infrastructural investments 
tended to be concentrated in the three centres, an advantage 
which was to be enhanced after independence through the 
deliberate policy of developing industrial estates in these 
specific locations and the external or agglomeration eco-
nomies that resulted. Other related factors are the con-
centration of available markets in the generalized growth 
region together with the implied savings in transport costs 
as most inputs and equipment are imported. This last factor 
tends to favour Accra-Tema and Takoradi more than Kumasi. 
Even so, the increasing dominance of Accra-Tema over other 
locations can only be fully understood by its proximity to 
the centre of governmental power in the capital city. 'This 
centralization helps to minimize difficulties of contact 
with tpe ministries and other governmental agencies in 
such things as passports for travel and import licence 
negotiations for traders and private industrialists. In 
fact this reason was cited as one of the greatest handicaps 
or obstacles to industrial development or success in the 
other urban centres and peripheral areas. '42 
An 'open door' policy together with favourable protec-
tive tariffs, industrial estates, and other concessions 
coupled with a market-threatening situation eventually led 
to a shift of expatriate commercial firms into industrial 
ventures. There were a number of joint state-UAC industrial 
ventures in textiles, beer, soap, cosmetics and vehicle 
assembly plants. An Anglo-American consortium was also to 
establish the ,Pioneer Tobacco Company, whilst a number of 
joint foreign ventures led to the establishment,of cement 
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and aluminium products. Other joint ventures went into 
purely consumer luxuries such as electronics. 43 The latest 
and most absurd additions are five car assembly plants. 
Hence, despite the substantial growth of secondary 
industry in Ghana, it is questioncilile ill view Of theo~nE!:r:­
ship and type of industry whether the growth has had any 
substantial generative effect. 'With tariff protection, 
an importer in an underdeveloped country can shift from 
a highly competitive environment to an oligopolistic 
market environment simply by meeting the cost of invest-
ment. This procedure has been followed by some overseas 
manufacturers and by entrenched merchant interests. '44 
It was this form of industrialization and the general 
dependent nature of the economy on international trade 
,which was to generate a crisis in development planning. 
The crisis is described as structural because it is 
the result of the inherent inefficiency in the dominance-
dependency structure within ·which the dependent national 
economy has to operate. 
WHY THE CRISIS 
The dominant extractive processes now operate more between 
the industrial enclaves of Accra-Tema, Sekondi-Takoradi 
and Kumasi, and the rest of the nation at large with a 
secondary extractive process still operating betweE!n the 
export enclaves and the non-export sub-sectors of the non-
industrialized areas. In a sense, the industrial-urban 
region could be described as the new growth region and the 
export cash crop sector its new periphery as industrial-
urban expansion was fostered largely through the extrac-
tion of surplus from the cocoa sector. The old periphery 
still continued to be subordinated to a large extent to 
the new periphe:ry through labour support to the cash crop 
sector. This position is being eroded with the emergence 
of opportunities for commercial crop development in the 
old periphery although this is not yet on such a scale as 
to horizontalize the vertical interaction between old and 
new peripheries. 
For example, it is evident that between the industrial 
enclaves and the nation at large, much of the foreign ex-
change earnings which facilitate the importation of capital 
eqUipment and raw materials and the development of the 
infrastructural support was derived from the foreign ex-
change earnings from cocoa, timber, gold and diamonds. 45 
These import substitution industries are characterized 
by a poor operational efficiency, under-utilization of 
plant capacity,and therefore operated at high production 
costs, and only survive competition from outside sources 
behind high tariff walls. 40 What this implies is the relay 
of high production .costs - a situation worsened by devalu-
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ation as most raw materials and spare parts are imported -
onto the consumer in terms of higher prices, thus resulting 
in the decline in real income in the agricultural non-in-
dustrial areas. This implies capital transfer into the 
core region as a result of the price deterioration. Manu 
has shown a general decline in cheaper consumer goods im-
ports as import substitution industrialization matured and 
yet these cheaper consumer items are the main purchases 
from the industrial sector by farmers. 47 Devaluation had> 
this unduly depressing effect on farmers because it was 
coupled with increased tax from the cash crop sector. 48 
The situation in the agricultural peripheries was 
worsened through vertical control of producer price policy 
at the core region through the CMB, Cotton and Bast Fibre 
Development Boards, Ghana Tobacco Company and even decreed 
minimum guaranteed prices from the centre, all much below 
existing market prices at the local or world level. The in-
dustrialists at the centre could often put their case well 
for price adjustments whilst by contrast producer price 
decrees were very often insensitive to the increasing pro-
duction cost structure in agriculture. These organizational 
structures facilitate central control and extraction of 
surplus. Besides, there is widesprea~ formal (Food Distri-
bution Corp.) and informal control of foodstuff marketing 
by urban-centred miadlemen, who build up savings for them-
selves in a few urban enclaves. 49 The recently established 
committee on agricultural pricing has not ~ade the situation 
any better as costing and pricing methods are still aimed 
at keeping agricultural prices low in order to satisfy urban 
interest groups.50 
It has also been demonstrated that those benefiting 
from the revolution in rice and maize production are not 
Ghanaian villagers whose lives are rooted in the land, but 
rather rich farmers, civil servants, businessmen, contractors 
and military officers who ultimately syphon-off profits to 
the industrial core region and the few regional centres. 51 
In all, peripheral regions like Brong Ahafo's north-east and 
Northern Ghana bore the brunt of it all. Labour continued to 
be exploited in the cocoa belt and the location of industries 
at the coast implies that the prices are highest in the 
poorer regions because of. high transport costs. And yet it 
is here that people can little afford to pay. 
Another mechanism of extractive domination is the much 
reported mass rural exodus to the industrial core-region lead-
ing> to age and sex imbalances inimical to cocoa and foodstuff 
production. It is estimated that whilst between 400,000 to 
500,000 or 10 to 13 percent of the labour force remains un-
employed in the urban areas notably within the core region, 
the average age of the farmer is around 60. 52 
Import SUbstitution industrialization has created a 
perpetual balance of payments crisis as capital goods, raw 
materials and> even foodstuffs were being increasingly import-
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ed under conditions of heightening adverse terms of trade 
for the raw material exports vis-a-vis capital equipment 
imports at the international level of exchange. Nor could 
the export cash crop sector expand further as the expansion 
of import substitution industrialization was .. at .. the .expense. 
of export expansion with the extraction of surplus from 
this sector providing the basis for industrialization. Agri-
culture remained static as a capital goods sector was not 
developed to dynamize agricultural production. The input-
output table for Ghana shows ve·ry little intersectoral in-
dustrial flows. within the national economy. Central author-
ities are currently preoccupied with solving the balance of 
payments constraints on the economy and this requires the 
attempt to develop local raw material substitutes and local 
foodstuff supplies. The ability of peripheral areas to de-
velop then becomes a function of their ability to serve this 
new structure of interests and the necessary demand generated. 
The pattern to date, however, has been marked by increasing 
spatial concentration rather than a decrease and a trend 
towards regional equality. This has been a function of the 
outward-directed satellite nature of the national economy 
and the structural constraints this imposed on the possibil-
ity for an internally~ntegrated auto-centred development. 
A dependent economy erected on capitalist premises is there-
fore likely to increase re~ional inequalities and disarticul-
ate the national economy.5 This sitUation, although.exacer-
bated through the concentration on global national and sec-
toral planning, cannot be remedie~by a mere injection of 
regional planning into the system but through more funda-
mental attempts aimed at steering the national system away 
from external dominance. 54 With development inward-directed 
and auto-centred, more serious attempts could be made to 
achieve greater interregional balance in power and develop-
ment. 
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